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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Keith Jorgensen's Magnavox Entertainment Center ob-
tained a judgment against defendant Craig Clark in the sum 
of $4,986.27 plus costs having sued Appellant pursuant to 
section 70A-2-709, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, action 
for the price. Appellant Clark and wife signed an Instal-
ment Sale Contract on or about August 16, 1976 to purchase 
a Model 284 Thomas organ and refused to make any payments 
under the agreement. Plaintiff Jorgensen obtained judgment 
for the full purchase price of the Thomas organ and defen-
dant Clark appeals that judgment. The issue primarily 
centers around the appropriate measure of damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding 
sittingwith a jury, granted judgment against defendant Craig 
Clark after a one day trial. Motion for a new trial by 
defendant Clark was denied as was motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. Appellant's counterclaim for 
storage was denied and not submitted to the jury. The jury 
answered several Interrogatories and the Trial Court entered 
judgment after memorandums were submitted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Clark seeks reversal of the judgment of 
the lower Court or in the alternative granting a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Clark saw an ad on television promoting 
Thomas organs at Keith Jorgensen Magnavox Center. He called 
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their downtown store in Salt Lake City and inquired in general 
about their Thomas organs for sale. Neither Appellant nor his 
wife played the organ. The same day, Saturday, August 14, 1976, 
Appellant drove from his horne in Roy, Utah to respondents 
store in Salt Lake to examine their merchandise. 
Appellant was taken to the Fashion Place Mall location 
after hours, to examine organs having first inspected organs 
at Respondent's downtown store. Appellant wanted time to think 
about bu¥ing an organ and requested time to do so (R 86). 
Respondent's employee suggested a free horne trial offer. A 
new model 284 Thomas organ was delivered to Appellant on a 
free home trial basis by Respondent's employees. The organ 
was delivered that same night at approximately 11:30 p.m. 
Employees of Respondent left Appellant's horne approximately 
1:00 a.m. on August 15, 1976 after demonstrating the organ to 
Appellant. 
Store employees arrived on Monday, August 16, 1976 
at 7:00p.m. at Appellant's horne to see if Appellant had 
decided to purchase the organ. Appellant and his wife were not 
ready to purchase the organ at that time. Appellant's wife 
was basically against the idea (R 90). 
Appellant and his wife were talked into driving to 
Salt Lake to look at other organs that same night, August 
16, 1976. The parties arrived as the Fashion Place Mall 
was closing. Two employees of Respondent waited on Appellant 
and his wife as they perused Thomas organs. Although Appellant's 
wife was against the idea, Appellant together with his wife 
signed an Installment Sale Contract to purchase a Thomas 
organ. Appellant felt certain pressure to make a decision 
-2-
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that night from Respondent's two employees (R 92). 
Appellant wanted to arrange his own financing but 
was told the store arranges its own financing (R 93). The 
agreement was then signed by Appellant and his wife to pur-
chase the organ that was left in their home. Appellant 
left the Fashion Place Mall store approximately 10:30 p.m., 
the evening of August 16, 1976. 
Appellant, deciding he had made a mistake, called 
respondent's Fashion Place store in less than two days 
stating he would return the organ to the store or respondent 
could pick it up. 
Respondent's employee, Mark Wilkey, acknowledged that 
Appellant called within two days after signing the agreement 
offering to return the organ or Respondent come pick it up 
(R 54). Mark Wilkey acknowledged several other phone calls 
by Appellant to the same effect. Mr. Wilkey referred the 
matter to his supervisor, Greg Jukes. No decisions were 
ever reached by Respondent to allow Appellant to return the 
organ or that Respondent would pick up the organ. Appellant's 
requests were ignored by Respondent. Interestingly, Mark 
Wilkey admits that Respondent teaches its employees to 
place an organ in the home of reluctant purchasers. It 
seems the psychology of placing the organ in the home somehow 
makes the would be purchaser somewhat reluctant to have the 
same removed from his home and places something of a moral 
obligation on the buyer (R 33). Also, Mark Wilkey admits 
two salesmen waited on Ap?ellant at all times and further 
admitted there was some degree of pressure applied to cause 
Appellant to sign the Installment Sale Agreement (R 46). 
_,_ 
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Employees are on a straight commission. 
Appellant called every other day speaking to a 
variety of sales people over his request to return the organ. 
After approximately two weeks of calling, Greg Jukes informed 
Appellant Respondent was not going to take back the organ. 
Appellant did not make any monthly payments pursuant to the 
Installment Sale Agreement. The only sum paid by ~ppellant 
was a down payment of $310.00 on August 16, 1976. Appellant 
nor his ~ife have ever used the organ and it is stored in 
Appellant's home as they have refused to use it (R 99). 
There is no defect in the particular organ and it appears 
to operate satisfactorily. 
POINT ONE 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO AN ACTION FOR THE PRICE 
UNDER 70A-2-709 
Appellant effectively rejected the goods within a 
reasonable time precluding acceptance and action for the 
price under Section 70A-2-709. Upon delivery of merchandise 
a buyer under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, has an 
opportunity to inspect the goods, not only for their 
conformity, but also as to whether he wants to take them 
at all. See 70A-2-606 UCA, as ammended. Section 70A-2~606 
(l) (a) gives the buyer a reasonable opportunity to inspect 
the goods and to signify acceptance by some means. Importantly, 
Section 70A-2-606 (l) (b) allows the buyer a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect the goods and make an effective rejection 
before acceptance can occur. 
Rejection of a totaling comforming tender is of 
-4-
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course wrongful, and gives rise to non-price remedies for 
the seller, as in 70A-2-708, but it does not amount to an 
acceptance so long as the 3ta tutory procedural requisi ties 
for an "effective rejection have been met". See Section 
70A-2-606 (l) (b) and Section 70A-2-709 {3). 
See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 
\'lest Publishing Company, 1972, Chapter 7, dealing with 
Action For the Price-Goods Accepted,page 211, 
The most troubling case is the one in 
which the buyer has no substantive basis 
on which to reject or revoke but he never-
theless effectively rejects or revokes 
procedurally, that is, he acts in time and 
properly communicates his rejection or re-
vocation to the seller. All commentators 
agree that the Code draftsmen comtemplated 
effective rejections which might be 
substantively wrongful and intended that 
all such rejections forestall acceptance 
without regard to their substantive wrong-
fulness. Writing for the New York Law 
Revision Commission, Professor Honnold 
stated: "Buyer may have the power to make 
an 'effective' rejection even though his 
action is a breach of contract and subjects 
buyer to liability for damages. Professor 
Honnold's judgment is consistent with the 
negative implication of 2-606 {1) (b) which 
provides that failure to make an 'effective 
rejection' results in acceptance. The 
negative implication of that subsection is 
that any effective rejection bars accep-
tance-.--We conclude therefore, that a pro-
cedurally proper (that is, effective) re-
jection forestalls acceptance whether or 
not the rejection is rightful (that is, 
founded upon a proper substantive basis). 
This conclusion is consistent with the 
policy behind 2-709, which normally imposes 
the burden of redisposing of the goods upon 
the seller. 
Appellant Clark by effectively cornrnurnicating to respondent 
his rejection of the organ precluded action for the price 
under 70A-2-709. Communication was undeniably received 
by Respondent that Appellant Clark did not want the organ 
-5-
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and he would bring it to Respondent's place of business 
or Respondent may pick it up. This rejection was within 
two days after signing the Installment Sale Agreement, 
not an unreasonable time to inspect the goods and commu-
nicate an effective rejection to Respondent. Appellant 
had the organ in his home only a total of four days 
before communicating his rejection to Respondent. 
Respondent had a remedy under Section 70A-2-708 
for nona9ceptance and could have recovered the difference 
between the market price at the time and place for tender 
and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental 
damages. Instead it choose specific performance, that 
is, action for the total price. 
According to 3A Bender's Uniform Commercial Code 
Service Seller's Action For The Price Section 13.06, page 
13-76' 
When there is a rejection of goods, the 
buyer is not exercising any control or 
dominion over them, whether the rejection 
is rightful or wrongful. In essence, it 
would be essential for the seller, re-
gardless of the cause of the rejection, to 
recover the goods from the carrier, bailee 
or the buyer. He should take the appropriate 
action necessary to accomplish this purpose. 
See, also, Peters,"Remedies for Breach of Contracts Re-
lating to Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code: A Road Map for Article 2," 73 Yale Law Journal 
19 9 , 2 41 e t seq . (19 53 ) , 
Upon arrival, the buyer has an opportunity to 
inspect the goods, not only for their comfor-
mity, but also as to whether he wants to take 
them at all. Rejection of a totally 
conforming tender is of course wrongful, 
and gives rise to non-price remedies for the 
seller, but it does not amount to an accep-
-6-
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tance so long as the statutory procedural 
requisites for an "effective" rejection 
have been met. 
Clearly, when there has been a right or wrongful rejec-
tion of the goods, the seller has an obligation to 
recover the goods in question and he should take the 
appropriate action necessary to accomplish this purpose. 
All authors agree the seller is further entitled to his 
non-price remedies. 
-One who rejects in an effective manner is not 
liable under Section 70A-2-709 even though this may be 
a wrongful act. Section 70A-2-602 UCA deals with rejec-
tion. Rejection of goods must only be made within a reason-
able time after the delivery or tender. 
-7-
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POINT TWO 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
NOT SUBMITTING DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Appellant Clark submitted several (20) proposed 
jury instructions which were all rejected by the Trial 
Court as "argumentative". The Trial Court did not alter, 
amend or substitute for Appellant proposed instructions 
and thereby effectively prevented Appellant's theories 
from go~ng before the jury. 
Appellant's proposed Jury Instruction No. 1 is 
a restatement of 70A-2-709 in its entirety. Respondent. 
admitted during the course of the trial that it was suing 
under Section 70A-2-709. Appellant should have been 
allowed to have argued that Respondent had not proved all 
of the essential elements under Section 70A-2-709. That 
is, Respondent should have been required to prove (1) 
the goods were accepted (70A-2-709 (1) (a)) and that 
the goods were not rejected by Appellant (70A-2-709 (3)). 
The Trial Court did not require the Respondent to meet its 
burden of proof on all the essential elements of Section 
70A-2-709. 
It seems elementary that if Respondent's theory 
was for the price under 70A-2-709, the statute, or its 
restatement, should have been submitted to the jury to 
decide if the facts warranted a remedy under Section 
70A-2-709. 
~ore importantly, counsel would have had an 
opportunity to argue the elements or lack thereof to 
the jury. 
-8-
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Jury Instruction No. 2 was also rejected by the 
Court as "argumentative". Instruction No. 2 sets forth 
Section 70A-2-706. A remedy which is available to Respon-
dent if the case is not a proper action for the price. 
Appellant was effectively prevented from arguing that 
other remedies were available to Respondent, other 
than action for the price. 
The Trial Court failed to instruct the jury of 
the ava~lability of Section 70A-2-708, regarding damages 
for non-acceptance. Appellant's proposed instruction 
No. 1 refers to section 70A-2-708 indicating, a seller who 
is held not entitled to the price under this section 
shall nevertheless be awarded damages for nonacceptance 
under the preceding section, (70A-2-708). 
Appellant took exception to the court failing to 
instruct the jury as requested (R 120-123). 
-9-
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POINT THREE 
TRIAL COURT'S JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS WERE INADEQUATE 
The Trial Court did not submit one instruction 
to the jury concerning formation of a contract, acceptance 
of the goods, rejection of the goods, damages, and avail-
ability of other remedies to Respondent. 
Two Interrogatories were submitted to the jury con-
cerning selling techniques of merchants to persuade buyers 
to purchase goods. These Interrogatories are totally 
inadequate to present to the jury the issue of rejection 
of the goods and preclusion of 70A-2-709 as a remedy. 
Appellant took exception to the lack of proper 
jury instructions submitted to the trier of fact (R 122). 
The Trial Court did not submit to the jury for 
its factual determination whether Respondent had proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence all of the essential 
elements of an action for the price, which necessarily 
includes proof of acceptance or lack of effective rejection. 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT FOUR 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 SUBMITTED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT IS AN 
ERRONEOUS STATEMENT OF THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
The Trial Court, in Question No. 2, asked the jury 
to find, 
What value do you find proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the organ would 
have brought if sold on a "forced sale" 
basis at or about the time the defendant 
denounced the contract? 
Value: $ __________ __ 
Explanation: 
If there was a market for such an item, 
such as a market for used cars at an auction, 
then the Court needs to know what the actual 
value was at that time. 
The Trial Court has erroneously stated the measure of damages 
by asking the jury to find the value of the organ on a 
"forced sale" basis. Under Section 70A-2-708, the measure 
of damages for non-acceptance is the difference between 
the market price at the time and place for tender and the 
unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages. 
The Court did not ask the jury to determine the 
market price at the time and place of tender. Nor did it 
ask the jury to determine any incidental expenses. 
There is no explanation where the Court came up with 
its own measure of damages, that is sale on a "forced sale" 
basis. 
The measure of damages under 70A-20-706 is the differ-
ence between the resale price and the contract price to-
gether with any incidental damages when the resale is made 
in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. There 
is absolutely no language concerning sale on a "forced sale" 
-11-
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basis. Interestingly, both Appellant and Respondent objected 
to the granting of this Interrogatory to the jury (R 122 and 
R 119). 
The jury placed a figure of $2,600.00 on the value 
of the organ if sold on a "forced sale" basis. 
-12-
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POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT DETEru1INED 
DAMAGES PRE-EMPTING THE JURY 
Even though the jury detemined that the organ 
would sell for $2,600.00 on a "forced sale" basis the Court 
ruled that Respondent was entitled to a judgment for the full 
price, plus interest at the rate of 16.25% interest from 
the date of the agreement August 16, 1976 to the date of the 
judgment February 5, 1979, plus $917.50 attorney fees. In-
terest for over two years at 16.25% interest is computed to 
be $1,165.77. Total judgment awarded was $4,986.27. 
Appellant had requested a jury trial and as such the 
jury should have determined the damages, if any, awarded to 
the Respondent and against Appellant. 
If credit for $2,600.00, computed on a "forced sale" 
basis, had been given to Respondent, the judgment balance 
would have been $303.00 plus interest and attorney fees. 
-13-
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POINT SIX 
THE ISSUE OF REJECTION 
AND ACCEPTANCE WAS A QUESTION 
OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED BY THE 
JURY NOT BY THE COURT 
Contrary to the requests of Ap?ellant no jury 
instruction or Interrogatory was submitted by the Trial Court 
to determine the factual issue of rejection or acceptance of 
the organ. 
Appellant submitted to the Court Proposed Jury 
Instruction No. l but it was rejected by the Trial Court 
as being "argumentative". The Trial court did not submit 
to the jury the issue of whether the organ had been rejected, 
or in the alternative accepted, by Appellant. The Trial 
Court ruled in its Hemorandum Decision the organ had been 
accepted by Appellant. In its decision, the Trial Court 
stated, "under the new Consumer Protection Statutes, 
the plaintiff may still sue for the purchase price when the 
merchandise has in fact been examined and accepted and 
where the merchandise is not in any way deficient." 
It is not known what the Trial Court meant by new 
Consumer Protection Statutes. The only law relied upon by 
Appellant is the Uniform Commercial Code adopted and inter-
preted by the State of Utah. 
The issue of rejection or acceptance should have been 
submitted to the jury. The Trial Court effectively prevented 
Appellant's arguments to the jury by not allowing them to 
decide the issue. 
Questions of acceptance or rejection of goods are to 
be resolved by the finder of fact and depend upon ascertain-
-14-
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ment of the intent of the parties, Chrysler Corporation vs. 
Adamitic, Inc. 208 N.vl. 2d 97, 59 Wis, 2d 219 (1973). 
\"/hat constitutes a conforming delivery, acceptance, 
rejection, or revocation of acceptance, with respect to the 
sale of goods or questions of fact to be determined within 
the frame work of the facts in each particular case, Marine 
Mart, Inc. vs. Pearce 480 S.W. 2d 133, 252 Ark. 601 (1962). 
Also, in Trio Estates, Limited vs. Dyson 178 S.E. 
2d 778, _10 N.C. App. 375 (1971), where the Buyer admitted 
purchase and receipt of a machine and that he did not make 
installment payments, denial by Buyer of any indebtedness 
to Selle~ raised an issue as to whether the Buyer had accepted 
the machine, which issue should have been determined by the 
jury from a consideration of all of the evidence in connec-
tion with the statute relating to acceptance of goods. 
Reference is also made to Cervitor Kitchens, Inc. 
vs. Chapman 500 P. 2d 783, 7 Wash. App. 520 (1972), holding 
if facts are disputed, question of what is a reasonable time 
for Buyer to inspect delivered goods before he will have 
been deemed to have accepted them and question as to whether 
Buyer's acts after delivery are inconsistent with Seller's 
ownership are for trier of the fact. 
Also, of importance is Dehahn vs. Innes, Me. 356 A. 
2d 711 (1976), holding whether there is an acceptance of goods by 
reason of acts of the Buyer inconsistent with the Seller's 
ownership is a question of fact for trier of the facts to be 
determined from the evidence in each particular case. 
Determination of whether actions of the Buyer amounting 
to acceptance of goods or effective rejection in a particular 
-15-
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case, is generally made by the trier of the fact, overlapping 
considerations of whether the Buyer gave notice within reason-
able time and whether Buyer treated goods in a manner incon-
sistent with Seller's ownership, Specific Products, Inc. vs. 
Great Western Plywood, LDT., Tex. Civ. App. 528 s.w. 2d 286 
(1975) . 
Possession does not mean acceptance under Section 
70A-2-606, see Zabriskie Chevrolet Inc. vs. Smith 240 A. 
2d 195,_99 N.J. Super 441 (1968). 
From the cases cited herein, it is clear that it is 
a jury question whether there has been an effective rejection 
or acceptance of the goods and the same is certainly to be 
determined by the trier of the fact. In this case, the Court 
effectively prevented the Buyer, Craig Clark, from arguing 
lack of acceptance by failing to submit Proposed Jury Instruc-
tion No. 1 and the Court failed to present to the jury, any 
opportunity to rule upon whether acceptance or rejection had 
been made in this case. 
-16-
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POINT SEVEN 
RESPONDENT WAS NOT REQUIRED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT TO ~ffiET ITS 
BURDEN OF PROOF ON ALL THE ELEMENTS 
Appellant filed a general denial stating Respondent 
failed to state a claim against him upon which the Trial 
Court could grant relief. This placed the burden of proof 
on the Respondent to prove all the essential elements of 
an action for price. Those elements include that (1) 
Appella~t did not effectively reject the goods and (2) 
that Appellant accepted the goods. 
Appellant put on evidence before the Trial Court 
that he had called Respondent's employees two days after 
signing the Installment Sale Agreement rejecting the goods. 
This testimony was acknowledged by the Respondent's witness 
Mark l'iilkey. 
Accordingly, Respondent was called to meet its 
burden of proof on all the essential elements for an action 
for price. The Trial Court's instructions do not require 
the Respondent to meet its burden of proof as it failed to 
submit the issues of rejection and acceptance to the jury 
for its factual determination. In Trio Estates, Limited vs. 
Dyson 178 S.E. 2d 778, 19 N.C. App. 375 (1971), where the Buyer 
admitted purchase and receipt of a machine and that he did not 
make installment payments, denial by Buyer of any indebtedness 
to Seller raised an issue as to whether the Buyer had accepted 
the machine, which issue should have been determined by the jury 
from a consideration of all of the evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is res?ectfully submitted the judgment granted 
by the Trial Court should be reversed and set aside. Further, 
that a directed verdict of no cause of action in Appellant's 
favor and against Respondent should be issued, or in the alter-
native, grant a new trial to Appellant. 
Respondent is not entitled to an action under 
Section 70A-2-709 for the reasons that respondent has not 
met its burden of proof regarding issues of rejection and accep-
tance. Also, Respondent is not entitled to an action for 
price under 70A-2-709 as the Uniform Commercial Code specifically 
contemplated wrongful rejections precluding action for the price 
and limiting damages to non-acceptance sections. Appellant has 
the right to reject the Thomas organ in question precluding 
Respondent's action for the price. 
Appellent is entitled to a new trial because of the 
failure to submit appropriated jury instructions concerning 
issues of rejection and acceptance. Also, the Trial Court 
committed error in stating the jury should determine what 
price the organ would bring on a "forced sale" basis. Finally, 
the Trial Court determined the damages and not the jury 
contrary to Appellant's demand for a jury trial. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
RO 
Attorney for Appellant Crai Clark 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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